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Summary  findings
Afsah, Laplante, and Wheeler call for a revised model for  and communities need timely, accurate, public
the regulation of industrial pollution. They think the  information to assess factories' environmental
traditional emphasis on "appropriate  instruments," while  performance.
ultimately correct, is premature,  because agencies in most  * Orchestration, not dictation. Potentially high-
developing countries have too many problems with  leverage programs to add to the mix include community
information and transaction costs to implement any  environmental education, public disclosure of factory
instruments comprehensively.  performance ratings, and technical training programs for
Once regulators have better information, more  environmental personnel in polluting factories.
integrated information systems, more capacity for setting  *  Community control. This should be a current
priorities, and a stronger public mandate, it will not be  reality, not a goal of future programs. Strengthening
difficult for them to manage pollution  more cost-  central regulatory agencies should not empower them to
effectively. Overhasty introduction  of market-based  impose uniform standards on heterogeneous
instruments will not work and will probably discredit  communities under the guise of "efficiency." Local
those potentially powerful regulatory tools.  variations in regulation are legitimate.
The new model of regulation should relegate  * Structured learning. Agencies should initiate pilot
regulators to their proper place in the scheme of things.  projects and build larger programs as lessons from the
Factories' environmental performance is shaped by the  pilot projects are absorbed.
interaction of agents with different incentives. The state  * Adaptive instruments. Newly industrializing
should play a role in regulating pollution externalities,  economies can experience rapid changes in ambient
but the role of the community and market must also be  quality across air- and watersheds. Regulation should
recognized. In the authors'  view, appropriate regulation  focus on adaptation to these rapid changes. Regulators
in developing countries should incorporate five key  should be empowered to counter environmental
features:  degradation by tightening existing regulations, but the
* Information  intensity. Regulators need reliable data,  system should also minimize disruption for investors.
integrated  information systems, and the ability to set  Adjustment rules should be transparent  and linked to
priorities that reflect relative costs and benefits. Markets  publicly available data on quality and emissions.
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comments. In addition,  we would like  to express our gratitude  to our many collaborators  in the pollution
control agencies  of Brazil,  China, India, Indonesia,  Mexico  and Philippines.1. Introduction
Factories  in  developing  countries exhibit  great variety  in  environmental  performance
despite the widely acknowledged weaknesses of the regulatory framework. Even in the
poorest countries,  some plants would  satisfy OECD emissions  standards.  Similarly, a
great variety in environmental performance is observed in developed economies.
These  facts  create  a  problem  for  conventional  thinking  about  controlling  industrial
pollution. Given the weaknesses of the regulatory  framework in developing countries,
plants should treat the environment as a 'free'  input and undertake no effort to control
emissions.  On the  other hand,  factories  in  societies with  stronger regulatory  agencies
should  generally  be  in  compliance  with  the  standards.  Since  neither  conclusion  is
consistent with the facts, we must question the premises and develop a new paradigm for
understanding the performance of industrial polluters.
Our current research is addressing this problem in six large developing countries.  By
establishing partnerships with environmental agencies in those countries, we have been
able  to  observe  regulator-polluter  relationships  at  first  hand.2  Our  experience  as
'participant-analysts'  has revealed the limitations of the conventional regulatory model,
and suggested a number of significant directions for revision.  This paper summarizes our
findings to date, along with the potential implications for regulatory policy.
First,  it  is  clear  that  the  basic  assumptions  which  support  the  model  of  'optimal
regulation' -- full information and zero transactions costs -- are not met in practice.  This
undermines the implementation of both traditional command-and-control regulation and
economic instruments.  Secondly, we find that the regulator  is not the  sole source of
pressure on plants to improve their environmental performance.  Local communities and
market agents also play important roles.  As an alternative to  the traditional view, we
therefore propose a model of interactions linking four agents:  plant, state, community
and market.  This model focuses on the process that leads to efficient levels of pollution,
rather than on a priori identification of the optimum point by state regulators.
To illustrate the main features of our model, we present findings from two recent studies.
Our analysis of China's  non-compliance fee (or levy) for water polluters highlights the
effect of local  conditions on the  actual enforcement practices of regulatory  agencies.
When viewed through a non-traditional lens, practices commonly criticized as symptoms
of 'inefficient  administration'  appear closer to optimal behavior.  In a second study, we
2The  six countries  are: Indonesia,  Mexico,  Brazil,  China, Philippines  and India. Our agency partners  are
BAPEDAL  (National  Pollution  Control  Agency),  Indonesia; INE  (Instituto  Nacional  de  Ecologia),
Mexico;  CETESB  (Pollution Control Agency of  Sao Paulo State), Brazil;  FEEMA  (Pollution Control
Agency  of Rio  de  Janeiro  State), Brazil;  NEPA  (National  Environmental  Protection Agency),  China,
Tianjin Environmental  Protection Bureau, China; and DENR  (Department of Environment  and Natural
Resources), Philippines.  We are also collaborating with the Pollution Control Boards of eight Indian states
in a nationwide survey of the environmental performance of Indian factories.
2analyze Indonesia's  recently-introduced program for public disclosure of environmental
performance ratings for factories.  There is no room for such a program in the traditional
model, but we explain why it may strongly affect polluters in a world of multiple agents
and multiple incentives.
Finally,  we  argue that  the new  paradigm  has  State
important  implications  for  regulatory  policy.  Regulators  The Law
Regulators lose their role as sole enforcers, but
gain  the  potential  for  greater  effectiveness
through new policies which leverage the power
of communities and markets.  We suggest five
key  principles  that  can  form  the  basis  for  *Regulatory  Stasndards
structuring  environmental  agencies  and  their  * Market-based  tnstru mets
program design and implementation.  Igai  tiability
Figure  la
2.  The Traditional View of Regulation
Figure Ia presents the classic paradigm  for analyzing pollution control issues.  Here the
State holds center stage, with two principal agents -- Regulators and The Law -- expected
to set and enforce rules of environmental behavior.  In keeping with this understanding of
the problem, the policy analysis literature has focused on appropriate roles for 'ex  ante'
regulation  (standards  vs. market-based  instruments) and  'ex  post'  liability  claims  by
injured parties.
Figure  lb  provides  the  conventional  view  from  the  perspective  of  environmental
economics.  Pollution (N) is measured on the horizontal axis and costs ($) are measured
on the vertical axis. In this textbook view of the problem,  the regulator can quantify the
increase in Marginal Social Damage (MSD) as the pollution level rises.  There is also
sufficient  information to  quantify  increases  in  Marginal  Abatement  Cost  (MAC)  as
polluters reduce their emissions. The regulator determines 'optimum pollution' at point N*,
where MSD = MAC.
The  regulatory  problem  in  this  world  is
straightforward: Having determined N* with full  Traditional View
information, the regulator  seeks to  attain it by  Assumes:  S  Mai
using command-and-control (mandating factories  *Fult Infornation  Abatem.et
not  to  pollute  above  a  determined  level)  or  4No  Transaction
market-based  instruments  (setting  a  pollution  Costs
charge P*, or allowing factories to trade pollution  Focses  on  Damage
permits  within the  limit N* ).  Able  to enforce  at  *InStruments
will  because  transactions  costs  are  zero,  the  OtinilitX
regulator  simply  dictates  the  terms  and  the  Nz  N  Nt  N
factories respond appropriately.  By assumption,
the central regulator is and  should be  the sole  Figure lb
3decision agent in such a world.
As environmental economists, we support the view that optimum pollution is an appropriate
concept for regulation.  We also believe (and are working with our partner agencies to
demonstrate) that  pollution  charges  and  tradable  pollution  permits  can  be  effective
regulatory  instruments  under the  right  conditions.  However,  our  research  and  field
experience have convinced us that  the conventional regulatory approach does not  pay
sufficient attention to defining the right conditions.
3.  Strengthening the Foundations
Indeed, it  would be impossible for  us to defend some basic tenets of the conventional
model to our agency partners. They would not know what to make of assumptions like 'full
information'  and  'zero  transactions costs.'  These are not just  'approximations'  under
developing-country  conditions; they are dangerous chimeras which can divert attention and
scarce resources from real agency problems to grandiose programs which have no chance of
working. Let us be more specific:
3.1 Information and Transactions Costs
Our partner agencies are plagued by problems with:
*  Information:  Monitoring  quality  is  frequently  so  poor  that  compliance  with
regulations is difficult to assess.  Fragmentary data on factory emissions and ambient
quality are often non-computerized, and closely held by separate agency units charged
with  different  responsibilities.  Information  on  abatement  costs  is  almost  never
available.
*  Bureaucracy: The air and water quality monitoring units frequently don't talk to each
other, nor do they share information with those monitoring air and water emissions.
*  Human and technical resources: Agencies generally have little capacity for assessing
the net benefits of alternative programs and using the results to establish priorities for
allocation  of  scarce  resources.  Few  trained  inspectors  are  available,  and  it  is
impossible to monitor more than a modest fraction of polluting factories.
*  Political  support:  Serious  enforcement  frequently  encounters  potent  political
resistance.
To summarize, life in our partner agencies is one long encounter with limited information
and high transactions costs.
43.2  First Things First
Under  such  conditions  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  implement  my  pollution  control
program,  including  market-based  instruments.  Indeed  it  would  be  pointless,  and
ultimately counterproductive, to advocate large-scale implementation of pollution charges
or tradable permits under conditions which practically guarantee their failure.  Near-term
policy problems are more pressing and should be addressed first:
*  Identification of the small group of serious polluters which the agency can regulate
effectively with existing resources;
*  Mobilization of political and community support for meaningful action;
. First-stage  development  of  an  integrated  information  system  with  good  quality
control;
*  Establishment of ambient quality targets for polluted air- and watersheds;  linkage to
pollution reduction measures applied to target polluters;
*  Use of simple cost-effectiveness principles in the reform of licensing and inspection
procedures;
*  Development of  internal capacity  for priority-setting  using  integrated  information
systems;
*  Small-scale pilot experimentation with new regulatory instruments (charges, permits,
public disclosure, etc.)
If successfully implemented, these "simple" steps will lay the necessary foundations for
more sophisticated pollution control strategies. Without them we are likely to witness a
demoralizing series of failures, as fancy programs attempt to lift off with no launching
pad.
4.  Broadening the Vision
We have argued above that a regulatory  approach based on inappropriate assumptions
about information and  transactions  costs  has distracted policy  analysts  from  the real
implementation  issues in  developing-country  agencies.  At  a  more  general level,  we
would also argue that the traditional view of regulation is misguided because its focus is
too  narrow.  Conventional  policy  discussion  has  focused  almost  exclusively  on
interactions between the  State and  the Plant.  However, our  research has  suggested
powerful roles for two additional 'players':  the Community and the Market.
54.1 The Community
Recent  evidence  from  Asia,  Latin  America  and
North  America  suggests  that  neighboring  New Elements f/)
communities  can  have  a  powerful  influence  on
factories'  environmental  performance.
Communities which are  richer, better educated,  + Power  Plants
and more organized find many ways of enforcing  *Social  Norms
environmental  norms. Where  formal  regulators  are  *  Negotiations  munity
present, communities  use the political  process to
influence  the  tightness  of  enforcement.  Where  -
formal  regulators  are  absent  or  ineffective,
'informal  regulation'  is  implemented  through  .__
community groups or NGOs.  Figure  2
The  agents  of  informal  regulation  vary  from  country  to  country  --  local  religious
institutions, social organizations, community leaders, citizens' movements or politicians -
- but the pattern is similar (Figure 2): Factories negotiate directly with local communities,
responding  to  social  norms  and/or  explicit  or  implicit  threats  of  social,  political  or
physical  sanctions if they  fail to  reduce  the damages  caused by their  emissions.  In
countries as different as China, Brazil, Indonesia and the US, much of the variation in
factories'  environmental  performance  is  explained  by  inter-community  variation  in
income, education and bargaining power.3
4.2 The Market
Factories  operate  in  local,  national  and
international markets, where  many  agents can  New Elements (11)
affect  revenues  and  costs  (Figure  3).
Environmental  considerations  now  affect  the
decisions of  many  of  these  agents.  In  both  Plants  *  Reputation
industrial  and  developing  countries,  *Profits
environmentalism in  the  middle  and  upper  onsu
classes  is  a  significant  factor  in  consumer  Markets
decisions.  With  the  worldwide  advent  of  In
environmental  legislation,  investors  are  also
scrutinizing  environmental  performance.  . _
Among  other factors, they have to  weigh  the  Figure  3
potential for financial losses from regulatory penalties and liability settlements.  In recent
years, the importance of investor interest has been increased by the growth of new stock
markets and the internationalization of investment.  For similar reasons, international and
3For  evidence  from Asia, see Pargal and Wheeler  (1996),  Hettige,  Huq, Pargal  and Wheeler  (1996),  Huq
and Wheeler  (1993), and Huq, Hartman  and Wheeler (1996). Evidence  from Brazil and Mexico  can be
found  in Wheeler  and Witzel  (1995) and Hettige  and Witzel  (1996).
6local  suppliers  of  financing,  industrial  equipment,  and  engineering  services  are
increasingly reluctant to do business with flagrant polluters.
Recent  evidence  from  both  the  OECD  and  developing  countries  suggests  that
environmental reputation matters for firms whose expected costs or revenues are affected
by judgments  of environmental performance by customers, suppliers, and stockholders. 4
Many factors can affect  firms'  evaluation of their  environmental reputation, including
company  size,  export  orientation,  and  multinational  ownership.  For  reputationally-
sensitive companies, public  certification of good or bad performance may translate to
large expected gains or losses over time.
4.3. Multiple Agents, Multiple Incentives: A New View of Regulation
Once the Community  and the  Market are
. . ~~~~The  New Model:
introduced,  we  have  a  much  richer  and  Multiple  Agents,  Multiple  Incentives
more  robust  model  for  explaining  the  State
observable  variations  in  factories'
environmental  performance.  Clean
factories  are  perfectly  plausible  in  poor
countries, and the survival of dirty factories
in rich countries is not hard to understand.
In place of the paired  State/Factory model  Mar  Communit
of  regulation,  we  therefore  propose  the
'Regulatory Triangle'  which is depicted in
Figure  4.  . _  __  __  __  __  __  __  __  __  _._
Figure 4
Once we introduce  a world  of multiple agents and multiple  incentives, we must  also
rethink the regulator's  appropriate role in pollution management.  No longer is this role
confined  to  producing,  monitoring  and  enforcing  rules  and  standards.  Instead, the
regulator can gain leverage through non-traditional programs which harness the power of
communities and markets.  Within the 'triangular'  regulatory framework, for example,
there  is  ample  room  for  information-oriented  approaches  such  as  voluntary
participation/compliance  programs 5 and  public  disclosure of  factories'  environmental
performance.  A broader implication is that one size no longer 'fits  all'  for regulatory
policy design: Optimal combinations of regulatory tools will depend on country-specific
social, economic and institutional conditions.
What does this expanded view of regulation mean in practice?  To draw out some of the
implications, we  will  summarize the  results  of  recent  collaborative projects  with  the
National Environmental Protection Agency of China (NEPA) and the National Pollution
Control Agency of Indonesia (BAPEDAL).
4See  Arora and Cason (1994), Hamilton (1995), Hettige, et. al. (1995) and Laplante and Lanoie (1994).
5  See  Afsah,  Laplante,  and  Makarim  (1996)  for  a  discussion  of  PROKASIH,  Indonesia's  river
management program.
7Case 1: China's Pollution Levy
China's pollution levy is one of the few economic instruments with a long, documented
history  of application  in  a developing  country.  Article  18 of  China's  Environmental
Protection Law specifies that "in cases where the discharge of pollutants exceeds the limit
set by the state, a  compensation fee shall be charged  according to  the quantities and
concentration of the pollutants released".  At present, approximately 300,000 factories are
monitored  and potentially  subject to  levy collections by national, provincial and  local
regulators.
Although the levy experience has not previously been analyzed systematically, a number of
case studies have suggested that the system is poorly administered, that enforcement is
largely arbitrary, and that the system is ineffective in controlling pollution.  We recently
tested this view of the levy system in a collaborative project with NEPA and the Bank's
Country Department EA2, using  a  new  database which  records the  experience of  29
Chinese provinces and urban regions during the period 1987-1993.  6  We studied the water
pollution  levy  because  its  implementation  and  impact  were  well-documented  in  the
information available to us.  Our econometric analysis focused on explaining variations in
two province-level measures:  Industrial emissions intensity (provincial emissions/output)
for chemical oxygen demand (COD -- a common measure of organic water pollution) and
the  effective water pollution  levy rate  (provincial levy  collections for  above-standard
wastewater discharge/total above-standard wastewater discharge).  Differences in factory-
level monitoring and enforcement can cause the effective levy rate to vary widely across
provinces.
The official levy rate  determined by  the
national  government applies  uniformly  China's  Effective  Pollution  Levy
across China.  However, Figure 5 shows
that  the  effective  levy  rate  varies
significantly  across  provinces.  More
importantly,  the pattern  of variation  is not
random:  Effective levies are much higher  Dn  31M
in urbanized/industrialized  provinces of the
country, particularly in the eastern coastal
regions.
Large increases in the official levy since
1987  and  significant  variations  in  Figure 5
enforcement have also created a strongly-
differentiated pattern of pollution intensities across provinces and over time.  We have
estimated that from 1987 to 1993, provincial COD intensities fell at a median rate of 50%
and total COD discharges declined at a median rate of 22%.
6Wang  and Wheeler (1996)
8Hence, contrary to the conventional wisdom,  .
our results suggest that the water pollution  DeterminantsofLocalEnforcement
levy has been neither arbitrarily administered
nor ineffective in China. As shown in Figure
6, two sets of local factors make significant
contributions to explaining variations in the  _tam
effective  levy.  The  first,  reflecting  the
principles  of  environmental  economics,  is  X  Da  Cr  Caa t
local  valuation of  pollution damage.  This  P"on  Load  C  informaion
has three components:  total pollution load;  a  Expiosed  Population  a Education
size  of  exposed  population; and  local  . Income  BargainingPower
income.  The second is community capacity  Figure 6
to  understand  and  act  on  local  environmental  problems,  indexed  by  measures  of
information, education and bargaining power.7
Our  results  are  consistent  with  the  multiple-agent model.  Lacking  the  appropriate
information for  determining  optimal pollution  levels  in  each  province,  the  national
government sets the official pollution levy at a 'reference level' and lets officials in each
province trade off the costs and benefits of effective implementation.  The implications of
this result are very clear: The uniform implementation of uniform standards and/or levy
rates is not optimal; local conditions determine what these should be.8 Thus, while enabling
national  environmental  authorities in  developing  countries  is  an  important  objective,
institutional strengthening programs  should also recognize that much of the action takes
place (and rightly so) at local levels.
Case 2: Indonesia's Public Disclosure Program
Enforcement of formal regulation in Indonesia is currently weak, and the modest size of
the regulatory budget assures that this weakness will persist in the near future.  However,
manufacturing  is  growing  at  over  10%  annually,  and  the  Indonesian  Government
recognizes  the mounting risk  of  severe pollution  damage.  Faced with  this  dilemma,
Indonesia's  National  Pollution Control Agency  (BAPEDAL) has decided  to  initiate  a
program for rating and publicly disclosing the environmental performance of Indonesian
factories.  BAPEDAL hopes that pressure on factories from public disclosure will provide
a low-cost substitute for formal enforcement of the regulations, and create incentives for
the adoption of cleaner technologies.
7Results  of a similar nature have also been obseved in Canada and the United States. For more details, see
Deily and Gray (1991), and Dion, Lanoie and Laplante (1996).
8 Our results do not imply that current effective levies are optimal.  Provincial regulators do not have all the
requisite information, nor do they have the capacity for a full assessment of this information.  In addition,
constraints imposed by low levels of community education or organization may reduce the  pressure on
local regulators to enforce  at optimal levels.  However, our results  do suggest that provincial effective
levies  reflect  significant  elements of  self-interest,  and  are  closer  to  optimum  arrangements  than  has
commonly been supposed.
9In  late  1994, BAPEDAL  invited  us to  participate  in  the design,  implementation  and
analysis of the public disclosure program.  The Bank's  Policy Research Department and
Country Department EA3 agreed to  support the project.  After six months of intensive
work by the BAPEDAL/PRD team, Indonesia's  Vice President Tri Sutrisno introduced
the program to the public in June, 1995.  It is called PROPER -- Program for Pollution
Control, Evaluation and Rating (or PROPER). 9
In  PROPER,  a  polluter  is  assigned  a  color
rating  based  on  BAPEDAL's  evaluation  of its  Grading Factories:
environmental  performance  (Figure  7).  A
Blue rating is given to  factories which are in
compliance with national regulatory standards;  BAPEDAL 's  \
Gold is  reserved for world-class  performers,  A
and  Black for factories which have made no  Five-Color  B
attempt to  control  pollution  and  are causing  System  D
serious damage.  Intermediate ratings are Red,
for  factories  which  have  some  pollution
control  but  fall  short  of  compliance;  and  ._.
Green, for factories whose emissions  control  Figure  7
and housekeeping procedures significantly exceed those needed for compliance.
Why  might  PROPER  be  expected  to  have  a
significant impact on pollution? We turn to the  PROPER'S Potential Impact
regulatory  triangle  model  (Figure  8)  for  an  BAPEDAL
explanation.  First,  while  we  have  noted  a  \  Infometon  &
pervasive  pattern  of  'informal  regulation,'  or  Rtn
community  influence  on  polluters'  behavior,  t
our  findings  also  suggest  that  information
problems may distort communities' perceptions  ZC
of their pollution problems.  For example, it is  Market
often easy to see  (and/or smell) the impact of  Markets  ommunity
organic  water  pollution  or  sulphur  oxide  air
pollution.  However,  emissions  of  Figure  8
bioaccumulative metals and toxins are likely to escape notice.  Even where pollutants are
clearly visible, local communities frequently cannot gauge the severity of their long-run
impact.  In addition, communities downstream from polluting industrial complexes often
have difficulty identifying individual culprits.
Public disclosure offers significant empowerment to  local communities in this context.
Armed  with  government-certified  performance  ratings,  they  are  in  a  much  stronger
position to negotiate pollution control agreements with neighboring factories.
9 For more details, see Wheeler and Afsah (1996).
10Secondly, from the market perspective, PROPER
provides  a  novel  application  of  'incentive  Carrots  and Sticks  in
regulation'  principles.  Traditional  regulation  has  PROPER
been  plagued by  an  important principal-agent  GOLD
problem:  Regulators need good data about firms'  *  Beyond Compliance
performance,  but  firms  have  clear  incentives  to 
withhold  such information.  Incentive regulation
follows  traditional  practice  by  penalizing  non-
compliance with  regulatory standards.  However,  *  Compliance
it also addresses the agency problem by rewarding
superior  performance.  This  improves  the
regulators'  information  by  encouraging  good  Figure  9
performers to identify themselves.  It also provides competitive incentives for superior
performers  to  help  the  regulators  identify  poor  performers,  since  the  latter  will  be
penalized by disclosure.
PROPER is expected to work in a similar manner. For non-compliant firms, BAPEDAL
expects that that the program will provide an enforcement 'stick'  which costs less than
conventional procedures.  The program also  offers important  'carrots'  in the  form of
Green  and  Gold  ratings.  BAPEDAL  hopes  many  firms  will  conclude  that  the
reputational value of Green or Gold status will warrant the costs associated with cleaner
production.  Moreover,  it  is important to  note that  because of  PROPER,  the  Agency
subjects  itself to  scrutiny and  creates  incentives to  improve its  performance through
transparency.  Hence, while an information release  program may  create incentives for
polluters to improve on their environmental performance, it also creates incentives for the
Agency to improve on its ability and capacity to collect and process information.
In  the pilot  phase  of PROPER,  187 plants were
rated.  When the program was officially launched  PROPER's Short-Term Impact
in June  1995, only the  names of the  five Green  )  .. I995  DI,1995
plants were publicly announced. The 121 plants  GOLD  o  O
rated as Red or Black were privately notified, and
given  until  December  1995  to  improve  their  l_  (3  1
performance.  Full disclosure  was implemented  on  61  (3 3  )  +  72
December 29; the pilot-phase results are displayed  6%
in Figure 10. They suggest that PROPER's short-  115  (61%lblOS
term  impact as  a  'stick'  has been  substantial.  6  (3%)  SO0%  3
Before full disclosure in December, half the Black  6.  - 3
plants  made  successful  efforts  to  upgrade  their  Figure  10
status, along with a substantial number of Red plants.
No  short-term  impact  is observable  in  the  'carrot'  range, but  this  is  not  surprising.
Attaining  Green  or  Gold  status  will  require  longer-term  investments,  while  rapid
11installation of basic abatement equipment can be  sufficient to  promote escape from  a
Black rating.
Though preliminary, these results from PROPER suggest that industrial polluters respond
to the incentives created by multiple agents.  Since the state is not the sole actor, it is
important for  regulators  to  recognize that their  role is  not  strictly  limited  to  that  of
enforcer.  In fact, they have access to a much larger set of instruments.  Further research
will be needed to determine the conditions under which these instruments will reinforce
or substitute for one another.
5. Toward a New Paradigm
In this paper, we have emphasized two points of
departure for a revised model of regulation.  First,  Broader Implications:
we  think  that  the  traditional  emphasis  on  State
'appropriate  instruments,'  while  ultimately
correct, is  premature because  most  developing-  Mk  +Cmui
country agencies have too many information  and  _
transactions  cost  problems  to  implement  any
instruments in a comprehensive manner.
New  Model  for Pollution  Manaaement
First  things first:  Once  regulators  have higher-
quality information, more integrated information  ._.
systems,  more  internal  capacity  for  priority-  F igure 11
setting,  and  a  stronger  public  mandate,  it  will  not  be  difficult for  them  to  manage
pollution more cost-effectively.  Overly-hasty introduction of market-based instruments
will not work, and is likely to discredit these potentially-powerful regulatory tools.
Secondly, the new model of regulation should relegate the regulators to their proper place
in the larger scheme of things.  The environmental performance of factories is determined
by the interactions of multiple agents, with multiple incentives.  Although the State can
and  should  have  a  continuing  role  in  the  regulation  of  pollution  externalities,  the
importance of the Community and the Market must also be recognized.
When these two sets of factors are taken into account, a different model of regulation
emerges.  In our view,  appropriate regulation for developing countries should incorporate
five key features:
*  Information Intensity:  Effective pollution management by the State is impossible
unless regulators have reliable data, integrated information systems and the capacity
to  set  priorities  which  reflect  comparative  benefits  and  costs.  Markets  and
Communities  need  timely,  accurate,  public  information  to  make  appropriate
assessments  of  factories'  environmental  performance.  An  effective  regulatory
12agency  will  therefore  allocate  fewer  resources  at  the  margin  to  conventional
enforcement and more to the generation and distribution of appropriate information
products.
Orchestration, not Dictation: A pollution control agency is only one player in the
environmental  performance  game.  Agency  activities  which  influence  polluters
indirectly,  through  other  agents,  may  be  as  important  as  direct  enforcement.
Potentially  high-leverage  programs  include  community  environmental  education;
public disclosure of  factory performance ratings; voluntary, public  agreements for
pollution  reduction  by  industry  groups  in  environmentally-degraded  regions; and
technical training programs for environmental personnel in polluting factories.
Community Control: This should be accepted as a current reality, not as the goal of
future programs. And in fact, a substantial role for local communities is appropriate
from the perspective of environmental economics.  Regardless of the state of formal
regulation,  local 'informal regulation' is stronger in areas with higher pollution loads,
larger affected populations and higher incomes.  We  also find independent effects for
local education  and bargaining  strength.  Taken together, our  findings  have three
implications.
1.  Strengthening central regulatory  agencies should not  empower them to  impose
uniform  standards  on  heterogeneous  communities  under  the  guise  of
'administrative efficiency.'  Much local variation in regulation is legitimate, and
should be recognized as such.
2.  Regulatory agencies can play a key role in facilitating negotiations between local
communities and neighboring factories.  This role includes provision  of reliable
information  on  emissions  and  local  ambient  quality;  technical  advice  on
abatement alternatives; and the transfer of experience from other locations.
3.  Central  regulators  can  use  their  authority  to  'level  the  playing  field'  for
communities  which  are excessively  polluted  because  their  lack  of  education,
organization and  bargaining  power prevents them  from  negotiating  effectively
with local factories.
13*  Structured Learning: Environmental
policy reform is a  complex business,  STRUCTURED  LEARNING
which  will  inevitably  be  subject  to
many  uncertainties.  Because  it  is
difficult  to  know  exactly  what  will 
work  in  advance,  reforms  should
emphasize structured leamning. Rather
than  pre-committing  to  broad-based
programs,  agencies  should  initiate  a
variety  of  pilot  projects  and  build  -;,
larger  programs  as  the  lessons  are
absorbed (Figure 12)
Figure 12
. Adaptive  Instruments:  Newly-industrializing  economies  can  experience  rapid
changes in ambient  quality across  air- and  watersheds.  Since regulation  should
primarily serve environmental quality objectives, it should be focused on adaptation
to these rapid changes.  Regulators should be empowered to counter environmental
degradation by tightening existing regulations.  On the other hand, the system should
minimize disruption for investors.  Meeting both objectives implies:
1.  Transparent adjustment rules, linked to publicly-available data on ambient quality
and emissions;
2.  Adjustment which is, to the extent politically possible, automatically triggered by
deterioration of ambient quality below mandated levels;
3.  Adjustment lags sufficient for smooth adaptation by local economic agents.
6.  Conclusion
Our view of pollution control has been fundamentally changed by our collaboration with
regulatory  agencies  in  developing  countries.  To  summarize,  we  think  that  the
conventional policy discussion is both too shallow and too narrow:  Too shallow, because
it devotes inordinate attention to instrument choice while ignoring the preconditions for
applying any  instrument effectively;  too  narrow because  it continues to  focus on the
State/Factory interaction as the sole determinant of environmental performance.
In this paper, we have argued for a less heroic approach to new regulatory programs, and
a broader model which includes the Community and the Market as major players in the
determination of factories'  environmental performance.  Finally, we have summarized
our current thinking in five key principles  for agency reform:  Information intensity,
orchestration, community power, structured learning, and adaptive instruments.
14We hope  that these ideas will help promote a richer policy  dialogue with our partner
countries, better project opportunities and, ultimately, better pollution management.
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